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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; assault weapon--furnishing of registration
information
Penal Code § 12288.5 (new).
SB 1860 (Davis); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1331
Under existing law any person who owned an assault weapon'
prior to the date that ownership of assault weapons was made illegal2
is required to register the assault weapon with the Department of
Justice Chapter 1331 prohibits a peace officer4 from broadcasting
over a police radio that an individual has registered or has obtained
a permit to possess an assault weapon, unless the officer has a good
faith belief that the individual has engaged in, or may be engaged in,
criminal conduct,5 or if the officer has a good faith belief that the
I. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276(a) (West 1992) (listing weapons that meet the definition
of assault weapon for the purpose of the statute, including, among others, AK Series weapons, UZI,
Galil, Baretta AR-70, CETME Sporter, and Colt AR-15 Series weapons); see also id. § 12276.5
(West 1992) (allowing the Attorney General to seek future judicial declarations that firearms other
than those specified in Penal Code § 12276(a) are also assault weapons).
2. See id. § 12280(b) (West 1992) (making possession of an assault weapon illegal); see also
Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 727, 729, 730 (9th Cir. 1992)
(upholding California's assault weapons ban against charges that it is preempted by federal law, that
it is an unconstitutional bill of attainder, and that it infringes on Second Amendment rights). See
generally Review of Selected 1989 California Legislation, 21 PAC. LJ. 442 (1990) (discussing
passage of the Assault Weapon Control Act of 1989). New Jersey has enacted legislation similar to
California's ban on assault weapons. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-12 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring
registration of assault weapons owned prior to the date that ownership of the weapon became illegal);
id. § 2C:39-9 (West Supp. 1992) (outlawing the manufacture, shipping, transportation, and sale of
assault weapons without being licensed to do so).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12285(a) (West 1992). But see David Freed, Assault Rifles Are Not
Heavily Used in Crimes, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at AI8 (citing statistics which indicate that only
70,000 of the estimated 300,000 to 600,000 assault weapons in California have been registered).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West 1985) (defining peace officer).
5. Uat § 12288.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 1331); see SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY,
ANALYSIS OF SB 1860, May 5, 1992 (stating that SB 1860 is designed to protect the privacy of
gunowners and to prevent theft of assault weapons by persons who listen to police scanners); County
of San Diego v. Department of Health Serv., 1 Cal. App. 4th 656, 661, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 259
(1991) (stating the general rule that a court may look to committee analyses to determine legislative
intent); Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808, 608 P.2d 716, 725, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628, 637 (1980)
(outlining the three elements of a tort cause of action for the public disclosure of private facts); see
also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980) (making a government entity liable for failure to
discharge a mandatory duty); Bradford v. State, 36 Cal. App. 3d 16, 20, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852, 854
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police are responding to a call in which there is a danger that the
person allegedly committing a criminal violation may gain access to
the assault weapon.' Broadcast of such information would also be
allowed in situations where the peace officer has a good faith belief
that the victim, witness, or reportee of the alleged crime may be using
the assault weapon to hold the alleged criminal or may be using the
assault weapon in defense of himself, herself or others.
7
JSP
Criminal Procedure; bad checks--collection of fees
Penal Code § 1001.65 (amended).
AB 3268 (Farr); 1992 STAT. Ch. 251
Existing law makes it a crime to pass a bad check.' Under
existing law, if the district attorney's office has collected and
(1973) (holding that a public entity may be held liable under Government Code § 815.6 even when
the employee who failed to discharge the mandatory duty would be immune); ARvo VAN ALsTvN,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILrrY PRACTICE § 2.82 (3d ed. 1992) (noting cases in which
public entities have been held liable under Government Code § 815.6); Recommendation Relating
to Sovereign Immunity, No. 1, Tort Liability of Public Entities and Public Employees, 4 CAL. L.
REvIsION COMM'N 801, 816 (1963) (stating that public entities should be held liable for failure to
comply with minimum standards of safety and performance established by statute or regulation);
BAJI No. 11.52 (7th ed. 1986) (giving jury instruction for cases involving a public entity's failure
to discharge a mandatory duty).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12288.5(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 1331).
7. Id. § 12288.5(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 1331).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 476a (West 1988); see id, § 476 (West 1988) (creating an offense
for making or passing fictitious instruments); see also People v. Burden, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1277,
1281, 253 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1988) (holding that the court did not violate its discretionary function
by imposing as a condition of probation for a person convicted of writing a check with insufficient
funds, a prohibition from opening or maintaining a checking or charge account).
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processed a bad check,2 it may collect a fee of not more than $25 per
check.3 If the bad check writer is not referred to a diversion
program,4 the court may impose a collection fee5 and require the
defendant to participate in a check writing education class.6 Chapter
251 dictates that if the district attorney elects to collect any fees, the
money collected shall be paid to the victim to compensate for any
bank fees incurred as a result of the bad check.7
DHT
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.60 (West Supp. 1992) (defining the act of writing a bad
check).
3. l § 1001.65(a) (amended by Chapter 251); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1719 (West Supp.
1992) (stating that the passer of a bad check may be liable for treble damages of not less than $100
or more than $500 if they fail to reimburse the payee within 30 days of the issuance of the check);
Mughrabi v. Suzuki, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1212, 1215,243 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440 (1988) (holding that an
award of treble damages is not a discretionary punishment to be determined by the court).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.1 (West 1985) (defining pretrial diversion program as a
procedure of postponing prosecution of a misdemeanor offense either temporarily or permanently at
any stage of the judicial process); People v. Hudson 149 Cal. App. 3d 661, 664, 197 Cal. Rptr. 36,
39 (1983) (stating that the statutory diversion scheme is an alternative to further prosecution); People
v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 61, 520 P.2d 405, 407, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (1974) (holding that
narcotic diversion programs seek to identify experimental drug-users before they become deeply
involved with drugs in order to provide education and counseling, and to alleviate over-crowding in
courts by disposing of cases involving lesser offenses, thereby allowing courts to devote time and
resources to more serious crininal prosecutions).
5. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1001.65(b) (amended by Chapter 25 1) (limiting such fee to $25
or $1,000 aggregate).
.6. Ud.; cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.08 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing a bad check diversion
program, and imposing fees for the collection of money). If the defendant is ordered to attend an
education class, the court is required to examine the defendant's financial condition to determine if
that person is able to pay the expense of the education class. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.65(b)
(amended by Chapter 25 1).
7. CAL PENAL CODE § 100 1.65(c) (amended by Chapter 251); see id. (providing that such
reimbursement for the bank charge is not to exceed $10); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.2 (West
1992) (providing restitution of pecuniary losses for victims of certain criminal acts). See generally
Daniel K. Weiss; Insufficient Fund Check Charges: the Need for Legislative Action, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
1003, 1003-16 (Fall 1984) (outlining the arguments for regulation of bad check fees).
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Criminal Procedure; booking and release
Penal Code § 853.6 (amended).
AB 3156 (Cannella); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1105
Existing law provides that a person arrested for a misdemeanor'
offense must be taken before a magistrate 2 upon request or released
with a written notice to appear in court.3 Under prior law a peace
officer4 had the option of booking' the defendant at any time before
the proceedings were finally concluded.6 Chapter 1105 provides that
the arrested person must be booked prior to release or, if released
without being booked, must provide verification that he or she was
booked and fingerprinted before court proceedings begin.7
LGC
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining misdemeanor).
2. See id, § 807 (West 1985) (defining magistrate); see also People v. Columbia Research
Corp., 103 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 33, 38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 455,457-58 (1980) (discussing the powers and
duties of a magistrate).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6(a) (amended by Chapter 1105); see id. § 849 (West 1985)
(providing the procedure for release of a person pending a court appearance); id. § 853.7 (West Supp.
1992) (providing that the violation of a promise to appear is a misdemeanor regardless of the
outcome of the original proceedings). See generally Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023,
1025 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the state must complete administrative steps within 24 hours of
the arrest); Mabry v. County of Kalamazoo, 626 F. Supp. 912, 914 (Mich. 1986) (finding that
warrantless detention beyond the time needed to take administrative action was a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 830-830.12 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (defining persons
included and excluded in the defimition of peace officer); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1031 (West Supp.
1992) (establishing minimum standards for persons having the powers of a peace officer).
5. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 183 (6th ed. 1991) (defining booking).
6. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 453, sec. 1, at 782 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6(g) (amended by Chapter 1105); see SENATE COMMtrrEE ON
JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF AB 3156, at 2 (June 25, 1992) (stating that the author's expressed purpose
for introducing Chapter 1105 is to curtail the large number of misdemeanor cases in California which
fail to be recorded because fingerprints are never taken during the cite and release process). But see
People v. Arnold, 58 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 5, 132 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (1976) (holding that a policy
of denying release because so many defendants were failing to show up, rather than because of
factors concerning the particular defendant was error). See generally Wayne R. LaFave,Ardcle: Being
Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process of Factualization in the Search and Seizure Cases",
85 MICH. L. REv. 427 (1986) (suggesting that booking and fingerprinting alone are a significant
invasion of personal liberty).
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Criminal Procedure; capital punishment--administration of the
death penalty
Penal Code §§ 3603, 3604 (amended).
AB 2405 (McClintock); 1992 STAT. Ch. 558
Under existing law, the death penalty is inflicted by the use of
lethal gas.' Chapter 558 provides that the death penalty is to be
inflicted either by lethal gas or lethal injection.2 Prisoners sentenced
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604 (amended by Chapter 558); see i. § 37(a) (West Supp. 1992)
(authorizing the death penalty for those convicted of treason against the state); id § 128 (West 1988)
(providing that perjury resulting in the execution of an innocent person is punishable by death); id.
§ 190(a) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that the death penalty is appropriate for murder in the first
degree); kL § 219 (West 1988) (stating that causing a train-wreck resulting in death is punishable
with the death penalty); i. § 4500 (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing the death penalty for an assault
resulting in death by a convict sentenced to life imprisonment); CAL MIL. & VET. CODE § 1672(a)
(West 1988) (stating that sabotage causing death is punishable by execution); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII (prohibiting the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment); CAL. CONST. art. , § 17
(prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment); id. art. I, § 27 (providing that the death penalty is not to
be deemed cruel or unusual punishment); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 444 (1980) (providing
that if a state wishes to authorize the use of the death penalty, it has the constitutional responsibility
to construct and apply its provisions to avoid arbitrary and capricious application of the law); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-81 (1976) (holding that since the framers were aware of and accepted
the existence of the death penalty, and in light of the fact that 35 states have enacted statutes
authorizing the use of the death penalty in certain circumstances, capital punishment for the crime
of murder was not per se cruel and unusual punishment) reh'g denied 429 U.S. 875, 875 (1986); In
re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 631-32, 447 P.2d 117, 130, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 34 (1968) (holding that
the death penalty inflicted by lethal gas does not violate constitutional provision against cruel and
unusual punishment) cert. denied 406 U.S. 971 (1972); People v. Oppenheimer, 156 Cal. 733,737-
38, 106 P. 74, 77 (1909) (stating that the California statute authorizing punishment by death does not
violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); accord Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (stating that the Eighth Amendment will be accorded a meaning in line with the evolving
standards of a maturing society); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1057-1061 (5th. Cir. 1989) (finding
that the pain and suffering invoked by poisonous cyanide gas is not sufficient as a matter of law to
invalidate state statute under the Eighth Amendment) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1133 (1989). But see
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (holding that no court could
validate any means of implementing the death penalty found to be unnecessarily cruel in comparison
to presently available alternatives); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 654,493 P.2d 880, 898, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152, 170 (1972) (stating that California's death penalty statute imposes cruel and unusual
punishment). Currently, only three states authorize death by lethal gas. ARIZ. CoNsT. art 22, § 22;
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604 (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 73 (1988). See generally Dan
Moraine & Tom German, Harris Dies After Judicial Due4 L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at A, col. 5
(describing the execution of Robert Alton Harris).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (amended by Chapter 558); see DERRICK HUMPHRY, FINAL
ExIT, 134-35 (1990) (describing one form of lethal injection as involving a first injection of sodium
thiopental to induce a coma, followed by a subsequent injection of pavulon and potassium chloride
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to death prior to or after the operative date of Chapter 558 must
choose the method of execution, and the prisoner's ultimate decision
must be submitted to the warden within ten days after the service of
the execution warrant upon the prisoner.3 If the prisoner fails to
choose the method of execution within the ten day period, Chapter
558 mandates that the death penalty is to be effectuated by lethal
gas.4
DHT
Criminal Procedure; child abuse--reporting
Penal Code § 11165.15 (new); §§ 11165.7, 11166, 11166.5,
11172 (amended).
SB 1695 (Royce); 1992 STAT. Ch. 459
to insure death); see also Campbell v. Blodgett, No. 89-35210, 1992 WL 61523 at *16 (9th Cir. Apr.
1, 1992) (rejecting defendant's argument that allowing a defendant to choose his method of
execution, and therefore participating in his own death, is cruel and unusual punishment) reh g
granted 1992 WL 292285 at *1 (1992); cf. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West 1990)
(defining the method of execution in Washington as either lethal injection or hanging). See generally
Stephen Comman, Lethal Injection: Attacking the Drugs to Invalidate the Punishment, 7 CRIM. JUST.
J. 363, 363-87 (1984) (describing the success of death penalty cases which have been challenged on
the basis of the means of execution).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(b) (amended by Chapter 558). If the prisoner's date of
execution is rescheduled, Chapter 558 dictates that the prisoner again must make the decision as to
the method of execution following the procedures described above. Id § 3604(c) (amended by
Chapter 558).
4. Id. § 3604(b) (amended by Chapter 558). Should either execution via lethal gas or lethal
injection be held invalid, Chapter 558 provides that the death penalty is to be imposed by the
remaining procedure. Id. § 3604(d) (amended by Chapter 558); see Briseno v. City of Santa Ana, 6
Cal. App. 4th 1378, 1384, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 490 (1992) (stating that the test for the severability
of a statute is whether the invalid parts can be severed from the valid parts without destroying the
unity of the statute or disrupting the statutory scheme, and whether the statute would have been
adopted had the Legislature foreseen the invalidity of the provision).
Pacific Law Journa/Vol. 24
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Existing law requires child care custodians,' health
practitioners,2 employees of a child protective agency3 and commer-
cial film and photographic print processors4 to report' to a child
protective agency any known or suspected' instances of child abuse7
they encounter within the scope of their employment.8 Existing law
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166.5(a) (amended by Chapter 459) (defining a
child care custodian as various personnel having regular contact with youth including administrators
(of schools, day camps, youth centers, and day care facilities), teachers, foster parents, social workers,
probation officers and district attorneys).
2. See id. § 11165.8 (West Supp. 1992); id. § 11166.5(a) (amended by Chapter 459)
(defining health practitioners as various health care personnel including medical doctors,
psychologists, dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors, nurses, dental hygienists, and optometrists).
3. See id. § 11165.9 (West Supp. 1992) (defining child protective agency as a police or
sheriff's department, a county probation department, or a county welfare department, but not school
district police nor security departments).
4. See id. § 11165.10 (West Supp. 1992) (defining commercial film and photographic print
processor); see also id. § 11166(c) (amended by Chapter 459) (describing the duty of a commercial
film and photographic print processor).
5. See id. § 11167(a) (West Supp. 1992) (listing the information required in a telephoned
report of suspected child abuse as the name of the reporter, the name and location of the child, the
nature and extent of the child's injury, and any other information requested by the child protective
agency).
6. See id. § 11166(a) (amended by 459) (defining reasonable suspicion as a situation where
it would be objectively reasonable for a person, based on the facts of a situation, to suspect child
abuse); see also People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409,413 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that when
a psychologist was told by his nine-year old patient that her father had fondled her breasts, he was
deemed to have had "reasonable cause to suspect" that she was a victim of child abuse and was
required to report this information).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (West Supp. 1992) (defining child abuse as a situation
when it would be objectively reasonable for a person, based on the facts of a situation, to suspect
child abuse); cf id. § 11 165.1(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992) (defining sexual abuse as sexual assault (such
as rape, incest, sodomy, and oral copulation) or sexual exploitation (such as prostitution and
pornography)); id. § 11165.2 (West Supp. 1992) (defining neglect as the negligent treatment, by act
or omission, of a child by a person responsible for the child's welfare under circumstances indicating
harm or threatened harm to the child's health or welfare); id. § 11165.3 (West Supp. 1992) (defining
"willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of a child" as a situation where any person willfully
causes or permits any child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the
care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be
endangered); id. § 11165.4 (West Supp. 1992) (defining "unlawful corporal punishment or injury"
as a situation where any person willfully inflicts upon any child any cruel or inhuman corporal
punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition).
8. Id. § 11166(a), (c) (amended by Chapter 459); see 67 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 235 (June 1,
1984) (requiring medical and noumedical personnel to report child abuse discovered while providing
professional services); see also Gladson v. State, 376 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Ga. 1989) (holding that a
statute that required "psychologists" to report instances of child abuse was not constitutionally vague,
and that in light of common usage, the word encompassed only licensed psychologists); Planned
Parenthood Affiliates of California v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 255-56, 226 Cal. Rptr.
361,363 (1986) (holding that the declaration of 67 Cal. Ops. Att'y Gen. 235 was too broad, and that
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grants these individuals immunity from civil and criminal liability for
any report made that is required or authorized by the Child Abuse and
Neglect Reporting Act.9 Existing law also requires these individuals,
except commercial film and photographic print processors, to sign a
form stating that they understand and will comply with their duty to
report instances of child abuse.1"
Chapter 459 grants and places all of the above protections and
requirements upon a child visitation monitor. t Chapter 459 also
requires child visitation monitors to receive training in child abuse
identification and reporting before monitoring their first visit.12 In
addition, Chapter 459 expands the definition of "child care
custodian" to include district attorney investigators, inspectors and
there is no duty to report sexual activity of a minor under 14 if it is voluntary and performed with
another of similar age). See generally Susan A. Collier, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral
Obligations Fail, 15 PAC. L. 189, 212-15 (1983) (describing the scope of the afirmative duty to
report child abuse); Robert T. Mertens, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial
Responses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 437, 443-46 (1985) (describing the California Legislature's
attempt to more effectively expose and prosecute child abusers); John E.B. Myers, Survey of Child
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Statutes, 10 J. Juv. L. 1, 11-27, 72 (1986) (listing the child abuse
reporting statutes for all fifty states and their various requirements); B. Kay Shafer, Child Sexual
Abuse and the Law: When a Child's Terrible Secret is Revealed, a Legal Nightmare Begins, 12 L.
A. LAw. 46, 49 (Sept. 1989) (describing how child abuse is usually reported).
9. CAL PENAL CODE § 11172 (West Supp. 1992); see id. §§ 11164-11174.3 (West 1998 &
Supp. 1992) (codifying the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act); Thomas v. Chadwick, 224 Cal.
App. 3d 813, 820, 274 Cal. Rptr. 128, 133 (1990) (holding that the immunity granted those persons
required to report suspected instances of child abuse is absolute); Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435
So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Ala. 1983) (holding that a doctor who reported a suspected instance of child
abuse to the police was absolutely immune, along with the clinic where he worked, from a civil suit
by the child's abusive mother pursuant to Code 1975, § 26-14-9).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.5(a) (amended by Chapter 459).
11. Id. § 11166(a), (b) (amended by Chapter 459); see id. § 11165.15 (enacted by Chapter
459) (defining child visitation monitor as any person who is financially compensated to monitor the
visit between a child and any other person when the monitoring of that visit has been ordered by the
court); id. § 11166.5(a) (amended by Chapter 459) (stating that child visitation monitors must sign
a form acknowledging that they understand and will comply with § 11166 and that they must receive
training in child abuse identification and reporting); id. § 11172(a), (b) (amended by Chapter 459)
(granting immunity to child visitation monitors for reporting child abuse).
12. Id. § 11166.5(d) (amended by Chapter 459); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18976(b),
18977 (West 1991) (describing goals of a parent and school staff primary prevention program and
the duties of a prevention training center).
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family support officers not working with court appointed counsel, 13
as well as peace officers. 4
ACR
Criminal Procedure; court proceedings--domestic violence
Penal Code § 977 (amended).
AB 2628 (Lee); 1992 STAT. Ch. 863
Under existing law, when only charged with a misdemeanor,' the
accused may appear by counsel only.2 Chapter 863 grants the court
the power to order that the accused be personally present, when the
accused is charged with a misdemeanor offense involving domestic
violence 3 or a misdemeanor violation of a court order relating to
domestic violence 4, upon a satisfactory showing of necessity. 5
Chapter 863 provides that where the court determines that the
defendant will make another court appearance within a reasonable
period of time and the defendant could be served with a restraining
order at that time the court may not order the defendant to personally
appear.6 Chapter 863 also authorizes a court to permit an initial
13. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1992) (describing circumstances under
which counsel is appointed by the court and the duties of that attorney once he or she is appointed).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7(a), 11166.5(a) (amended by Chapter 459); see id. § 830
(West Supp. 1992) (defining peace officer).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining misdemeanor).
2. Ic § 977(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 863).
3. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 542(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining domestic violence).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (West Supp. 1992) (providing a penalty for the violation
of a court order relating to domestic violence).
5. Id § 977(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 863); see hi § 136.2 (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing
any court with proper jurisdiction to issue orders to protect a victim or witness from intimidation or
dissuasion); cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3205 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 833 (West Supp. 1992);
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.030(2) (1990) (allowing a defendant, when accused of a misdemeanor, to
appear by counsel, but with no provisions relating to domestic violence and court orders). See
generally, Comment, Restraining Order Legislation for Women: A Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. REV.
703 (1982) (discussing domestic-related court orders, including procedures, sanctions, criminal
remedies, problems, and suggestions).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 977(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 863).
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arraignment on felony or misdemeanor charges, except for those
defendants who were indicted by a grand jury, to be conducted by
two-way electronic audio-video communication between the
defendant and the courtroom in lieu of defendant's physical presence
in the courtroom.7
Chapter 863 provides that the defendant has the right to make his
or her plea while physically present in the courtroom if the accused
so requests.! Under Chapter 863, if the defendant decides not to
exercise this right, the defendant must execute a written waiver of
that right.9
CPH
Criminal Procedure; criminal history
Penal Code §§ 11105.3, 11125, 11126 (amended).
AB 3773 (Conroy); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1227
Under existing law, a human resource agency' or an employer2
may request from the Department of Justice 3 records of all
7. Id § 977(c) (amended by Chapter 863). If the defendant is represented by counsel, the
attorney must be present with the defendant, and may enter a plea, during the arraignment. Id. See
generally Jeffrey M. Silbert et al., The Use of Closed Circuit Television for Conducting Misdemeanor
Arraignments in Dade County, Florida, 38 U. MIMIt L. REv. 657 (1984) (discussing the advantages
and disadvantages of Dade County's video arraignment system).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 977(c) (amended by Chapter 863)
9. Id. Chapter 863 allows a judge to order a defendant's personal appearance in court for
arraignment. Id In a misdemeanor or felony case a judge may accept a plea of guilty or no contest
from a defendant who is not physically present in the courtroom. Id
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.3(f) (amended by Chapter 1227) (defiing human resource
agency).
2. See id. § 11105.3(e) (amended by Chapter 1227) (defining employer as any nonprofit
corporation or other organizations specified by the Attorney General which employs or uses the
services of volunteers in positions in which the volunteer or employee has supervisory or disciplinary
power over a child or children).
3. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15000-15006 (West 1992) (setting forth the powers, duties, and
organization of the Department of Justice).
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convictions and arrests' involving sex-related crimes, drug-related
crimes, or violent crimes of a person applying for a license,
employment, or volunteer position involving supervisory or
disciplinary power, where the person will be caring for children, the
elderly, the handicapped, or the mentally impaired.5 Chapter 1227
expands the crimes for which such information may be requested.6
Further, Chapter 1227 clarifies that such records may be requested
for any arrest pending adjudication.7
Existing law prohibits any person or agency from requiring
another person to obtain a copy of his or her criminal record.8
Chapter 1227 prohibits a person or agency from requesting another
person to furnish his or her criminal record or notification that a
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.3 (amended by Chapter 1227) (specifying arrests for
which the person is released on bail).
5. Id. § 11105.3 (amended by Chapter 1227); see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § §700-708 (1992)
(detailing the requirements for providing criminal records); Review of Selected 1990 California
Legislation, 22 PAC. LJ. 699 (1991) (discussing amendments to § 11105.3 of the Penal Code); cf.
Central Valley of the 7th Step Found. Inc. v. Younger, 95 Cal. App. 3d 212, 236, 157 Cal. Rptr. 117,
131 (1979) (holding that information regarding non-conviction data is not subject to dissemination
to public employers). See generally George de Lama, Murder Case Shows Why Schools Want More
Background Checks, CHI. TRiB., Oct. 16, 1992, at C5; No-Nonsense Policy on Family Violence, US
NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 1984, at 74 (discussing the use of background checks on people who
work with children).
6. CAL PENAL CODE § 11105.3 (amended by Chapter 1227). The additional crimes include
the following: (1) Spousal rape; (2) enticement of a minor for purpose of prostitution; (3) enticement
of a minor to commit lewd or lascivious acts; (4) spousal abuse resulting in corporal injury; (5)
sexual assault on an animal; (6) providing harmful matter to a minor, (7) continuous sexual abuse
of a child; (8) employment of a minor in the sale or distribution of obscene matter, pornography or
advertisement of obscene matters depicting minors; and (9) possession or control of child
pornography. Id. § 11105.3(g) (amended by Chapter 1227). See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1750 (1992); HAw. REV. STAT. § 346-19.6 (1991); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 156.483 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 43.540 (Vernon Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 7-19-201 (1991)
(requiring the disclosure of criminal records when a potential employer or licensee will be in a
position to deal with minors).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.3(a) (amended by Chapter 1227).
8. Id. § 11125 (amended by Chapter 1227).
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record exists or does not exist, and provides that any violation of this
provision is a misdemeanor.9
SRM
Criminal Procedure; domestic violence--citizens' arrests
Penal Code § 836 (amended).
AB 2336 (Conroy); 1992 STAT. Ch. 555
Under existing law, a peace officer' may not make an arrest for
a misdemeanor2 offense without a warrant unless the officer has
reasonable cause3 to believe that the person to be arrested committed
9. Id. The author's stated purpose in enacting Chapter 1227 is to expand the reporting of
serious crimes to human resource agencies and specified employers. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE,
COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3773, at 2-3 (June 24, 1992). See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, 1 FINAL REPORT at 405-13 (1986); ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT at 102-07 (1984); William L. Chaze, Now, Nationwide
Drive to Curb ChildAbuse, US NEws & WORL REP., Oct. 1, 1984, at 73 (discussing legal and other
actions to protect children from child abuse).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1992) (defining peace officer).
2. See id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining misdemeanor). There are several offenses
classified as misdemeanors which could be committed in the presence of a citizen but rarely in the
presence of a peace officer, making a warrantless arrest impractical. See, e.g., id. § 241(a) (West
Supp. 1992) (making assault a misdemeanor); id § 243(a) (Vest Supp. 1992) (criminalizing battery);
id § 243A(d) (West Supp. 1992) (defining the offense of misdemeanor sexual battery); id. § 273(g)
(West 1988) (criminalizing indulgence in immoral, lewd or degrading practices in front of a child);
id § 273.6(a) (West Supp. 1992) (making the violation of a protective or restraining order issued by
a court a misdemeanor); id § 417(a) (Vest Supp. 1992) (making it a misdemeanor for any person
to draw or exhibit a deadly weapon or firearm in a rude, angry or threatening manner); id. § 415(2)
(West 1988) (making it a misdemeanor for any person to maliciously and willfully disturb another
by loud and unreasonable noise); id. § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1992) (making the offense of stalking
a misdemeanor).
3. See People v. Fein, 4 Cal. 3d 747,752,484 P.2d 583,586,94 Cal. Rptr. 607, 610 (1971)
(defining reasonable cause as that state of facts as would lead an ordinary and prudent person to
believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a
crime).
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the offense in the officer's presence.4 Existing law also requires all
state and local law enforcement agencies to adopt written policies and
standards for responses to domestic violence5 calls, including
specific standards regarding the use of citizens' arrests.6 Chapter 555
makes it mandatory that a peace officer responding to a domestic call
make a good faith effort to inform the victim of his or her right to
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a) (amended by Chapter 555); see In re Thiery S., 19 Cal. 3d
727,734,566 P.2d 610, 613, 139 Cal. Rptr. 708,711 (1977) (reading § 836 as allowing warrantless
misdemeanor arrests only when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor
offense has been committed in the officer's presence); Music v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 221
Cal. App 3d 841, 847, 270 Cal. Rptr. 692, 696 (1990) (reversing a license suspension for
misdemeanor drunk driving because the arresting officer did not see the accused actually driving);
see also People v. Welsch, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1042, 199 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90 (1984) (defining the
phrase "in the presence of" as observable to the peace officer at the time of arrest). The exception
to the warrant requirement allowing an arrest without a warrant when an officer has reason to believe
that a misdemeanor has been committed in the officer's presence dates back to the early English
Common Law. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976). There is nothing in the United
States Constitution that prohibits a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor being made when the officer
has reason to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed out of the presence of the officer.
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); see Fields v. City of South
Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 371 (4th Cir. 1974)
(holding that the United States Constitution does not require a warrant for a misdemeanor arrest made
out of the presence of the arresting officer).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining domestic violence); see
also Sonya Ross, Tighter Home-violence Laws Urged, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Oct. 3, 1992, at A-1
(reporting surveys indicating that approximately one million women were attacked by husbands or
lovers in the course of a year, that an additional three million violent domestic crimes went
unreported, and that a 1988 report of the Surgeon General listed violence as the number one health
risk facing women); Lisa Lerman, Expansion ofArrest Power: A Key to Effective Intervention, 7 VT.
L. REv. 59, 64 (1982) (suggesting that relaxation of the warrant requirement for arrests is necessary
for an effective police response to domestic violence, and listing examples of the statutes of several
states allowing warrantless arrests for misdemeanor offenses committed against family members).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701(c) (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 837 (West 1985) (empowering
private persons to make arrests under specified circumstances).
Selected 1992 Legislation
Criminal Procedure
make a citizen's arrest.7 The information must include advice on
how to safely make the arrest.'
JSP
Criminal Procedure; drive-by shooting--sentence enhancements
Penal Code § 12022.9 (amended).
SB 1649 (Leonard); 1992 Stat. Ch. 510
(Effective August 16, 1992)
7. l, § 836(b) (amended by Chapter 555); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980)
(making a government entity liable for failure to discharge a mandatory duty); Bradford v. State, 36
Cal. App. 3d 16, 20, 111 Cal. Rptr. 852, 854 (1973) (holding that a public entity may be held liable
under § 815.6 even when the employee who failed to discharge the mandatory duty would be
immune); ARvo VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOvERNmENT TORT LiABILITY PRACncE, § 2.82 (3d
ed. 1992) (noting cases in which public entities have been held liable under § 815.6); BAJI § 11.52
(1986) (giving jury instruction for cases involving a public entity's failure to discharge a mandatory
duty). But see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845 (West 1980) (providing that neither a public entity nor
employee is liable for failure to provide police protection); id § 846 (West 1980) (negating liability
of public entities and employees for failure to make an arrest or for the failure to retain an arrested
person in custody). See generally Gary Bishop, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to
the Problem of Police Officer's Inaction, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1357, 1361 (1989) (surveying cases in
which municipalities have been held liable for failure to provide adequate protection for victims of
domestic violence); Lisa McCabe, Police Officer's Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They Only Good
Samaritans?, 72 CAL. L. REv. 661, 662 (1984) (suggesting that peace officers should owe an
affirmative duty to rescue); Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, No. 1, Tort Liability
of Public Entities and Public Employees, 4 CAL. L. REvisION COM?'N 801, 816 (1963) (stating that
public entities should be held liable for failure to comply with minimum standards of safety and
performance established by statute or regulation).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(b) (amended by Chapter 555). A citizen may summon aid to
make a citizen's anest. Id. § 839 (West 1985); see People v. Richards, 72 Cal. App. 3d 510, 514, 140
Cal. Rptr. 158, 159 (1977); People v. Campbell, 27 Cal. App. 3d 849, 853, 104 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121
(1972) (holding that a private person may request that a peace officer perform the physical act of
detaining the suspect when a citizen's arrest is made). It is a felony for a peace officer to willfully
refuse to arrest a person when an arrest is authorized. CAL. PENAL CODE § 142(a) (West 1988). A
peace officer may not be held liable for false arrest or imprisonment when the arrest was lawfully
made. Id, § 847 (West 1985). But see Kinney v. County of Contra Costa, 8 Cal. App. 3d 761, 767,
769, 87 Cal. Rptr. 638, 642, 643 (1970) (holding that a person falsely arrested by a citizen has no
cause of action against the peace officer who took the plaintiff into custody, yet noting that the
plaintiff has a remedy against the offending citizen); Ramsden v. Western Union, 71 Cal. App. 3d
873, 879, 138 Cal. Rptr. 426, 430 (1977) (setting forth the elements of a cause of action for false
imprisonment).
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Under existing law, any person' who maliciously2 and will-
fully3 discharges a firearm4 at an inhabited5 dwelling,6 or who
discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle7 at another person is
guilty of a felony.' Under Chapter 510, persons who violate this
provision and cause victims to suffer paralysis9 or paraparesis'0 of
a major body part, will receive a four year enhancement" to their
prison terms. 2
BAB
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See id. § 7(4) (West 1988) (defining malicious).
3. See UL § 7(l) (West 1988) (defining willfully).
4. See id. § 12001 (West Supp. 1992) (defining firearm).
5. See id. § 246 (West Supp. 1992) (defining inhabited).
6. See id. (including dwelling houses, occupied buildings, occupied motor vehicles, occupied
aircraft, inhabited housecars and campers among those units that qualify as a dwelling for purposes
of this section); see also CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 218(d) (West 1987) (defiming dwelling).
7. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 415 (West Supp. 1992) (defining motor vehicle).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 246, 12034(c) (West Supp. 1992); see People v. The Superior Court
of Los Angeles, 213 Cal. App. 3d 54, 56, 261 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1989) (describing a situation where
a youth discharged a shotgun, from a moving vehicle, in the direction of a small girl and her aunt
as a violation of California Penal Code § 12034(c) and referring to it as a "drive-by shooting"); see
also AssI .BLY COMM. ON PUBLIC SAFETY, REPORT ON SB 1649, at 2 (1992) (referring to California
Penal Code § 12034 as the "main drive-by shooting statute"); ef FLA. STAT. ch. 790.15 (1991);
MICH. COMp. LAws § 750.234a (1991); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.287 (Michie 1991); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-47-51.1(a) (1991) (making it a felony to discharge a firearm from a vehicle).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9(b)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter510) (defining paralysis).
10. See id. § 12022.9(b)(3)(B) (amended by Chapter 510) (defining paraparesis).
11. See CAL. R. CT. 405(c) (defining enhancement).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9 (amended by Chapter 510); see ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON
PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrME REPORT ON SB 1649, at 3 (1992) (explaining that a major issue in
imposing sentence enhancements for causing great bodily injury is proving that the defendant
intended to cause the harm); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7 (West 1992) (providing for a
sentence enhancement for a defendant who causes great bodily injury to a victim during the
commission or.attempted commission of a felony); In re Sergio R., 228 Cal. App. 3d 588, 601, 279
Cal. Rptr. 149, 156 (1991) (holding that the intent component of California Penal Code § 12022.7
requires a finding that the defendant had the specific intent to inflict the great bodily injury). But see
People v. Bass, 147 Cal. App. 3d 448, 454, 195 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (1983) (holding that "intent to
inflict great bodily injury" is mere intent to commit the act, and the intent requirement is met when




Business and Professions Code § 7561.1 (amended); Code of
Civil Procedure § 237 (new); § 206 (amended); Penal Code
§§ 95.2, 95.3 (new); § 95.1 (amended).
SB 1299 (Davis); 1992 STAT. Ch. 971
Under existing law, a private detective's license1 may be denied,
suspended, or revoked if the Director of the Department of Consumer
Affairs (Director)2 determines that the licensee3 has committed
specified acts.4 Chapter 971 provides additionally that the license
may be denied, suspended, or revoked if the Director determines that
the licensee has been convicted of providing a defendant to a criminal
proceeding with information designed to facilitate communication
with or location of a juror in that proceeding.5
Existing law authorizes the defendant in a criminal case, his or
her attorney, or the prosecutor to discuss the jury deliberation or
1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7520-7539.5 (West Supp. 1992) (stating dhe
requirements for obtaining a private detective's license, and describing the form and content of the
license); cf MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 338.826 (West 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:19-12 (West
1978) (providing comparable requirements for obtaining a private detective's license).
2. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 100, 101 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (defining tite
Department of Consumer Affairs).
3. See id. § 7512.6 (West Supp. 1992) (defining licensee).
4. Id § 7561.1 (amended by Chapter 971) (providing that the acts include: (1) Having made
a false statement or given any false information in connection with an application for a license or a
renewal or reinstatement of a license; (2) having committed any act or crime constituting grounds
for denial of icensure under § 480 of the Business and Professions Code, including illegally using,
carrying, or possessing a deadly weapon; (3) having impersonated, or permitted or aided and abetted
an employee to impersonate a law enforcement officer or employee of the United States of America,
or of any state or political subdivision thereof; (4) having committed assault, battery, or kidnapping,
or used force or violence on any person, without proper justification); cf ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111,
para. 2679 (Smith-Hurd 1992); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 338.830 (West 1992); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 326.3387 (West Supp. 1992) (providing similar grounds for the revocation of a private detective's
license).
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7561.1(o) (amended by Chapter 971); see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 95.3 (enacted by Chapter 971) (providing that any person who knowingly provides a defendant or
former defendant to any criminal proceeding information to communicate with or locate a juror to
that proceeding is guilty of a misdemeanor).
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verdict with a member of the jury, provided that the juror consents to
the discussion and that the discussion takes place at a reasonable time
and place.6 Chapter 971 authorizes a defendant or the defendant's
counsel to request that the court provide personal juror information7
within the court's records necessary for the defendant to communi-
cate with jurors for the purpose of developing issues on appeal or any
other lawful purpose.' Chapter 971 requires the court to provide the
information requested to the defendant's counsel or any agent of the
defendant's counsel, but also allows the court to limit access to
sealed records.9
Chapter 971 mandates that the names of qualified jurors drawn
from the qualified juror list be made available to the public upon
request unless the court determines that a compelling government in-
terest requires that this information be kept confidential or its use
limited in whole or part."1 Chapter 971 further provides that any
court employee who has legal access to juror information that is
sealed and knowingly discloses that information in violation of a
court order is guilty of a misdemeanor. 1
Under prior law, any person who threatened a juror with respect
to a criminal proceeding in which a verdict had been rendered and
who had the requisite intent and apparent ability to carry out the
threat, so as to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 206(b) (amended by Chapter 971).
7. See idL § 206(0 (amended by Chapter 971) (stating that this information may include
jurors' names, addresses, and telephone numbers).
8. Id.
9. Id.; see id § 237(c) (enacted by Chapter 971) (authorizing the court to limit access to
records sealed to the defendant, defendant's counsel, or the defendant's investigator for the purpose
of developing issues on appeal or for any other lawful purpose).
10. Id. § 237(a) (enacted by Chapter 971). The court may, upon a juror's request, motion of
counsel, or on its own motion, order that all or part of the court's record of personal juror
information be sealed upon finding that a compelling governmental interest, such as protecting jurors
from physical harm or the threat of physical harm, warrants this action. Id. § 237(b) (enacted by
Chapter 971). The court may limit access to sealed juror records to the defendant for the purpose of
developing issues of appeal or for any other lawful purpose. Id § 237(c) (enacted by Chapter 971).
Chapter 971 authorizes the court to require agreement that the defendant, defendant's counsel, or
defendant's investigator not divulge jurors' identities or identifying information to others. Id.
11. Id. § 237(d) (enacted by Chapter 971). Chapter 971 also provides that any person who
intentionally solicits another to unlawfully access or disclose juror information contained in records
known to be sealed, or who knowing that the information was unlawfully secured, intentionally
discloses it to another person is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id § 237(e) (enacted by Chapter 971).
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or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family, was guilty
of a misdemeanor. 12 Chapter 971 provides that anyone who threa-
tens a juror in this manner is guilty of a public offense."3 Chapter
971 also provides that any person who intentionally provides 14 a
defendant or former defendant to any criminal proceeding infor-
mation from records, known to be sealed, for the purpose of locating
or communicating with a juror to that proceeding is guilty of a
misdemeanor.15 If a private detective provides the information, that
licensee is also guilty of a misdemeanor. 6
CPH
Criminal Procedure; pending nonfelony driving offenses--
prosecution for reckless driving and driving under the influence
Vehicle Code § 41500 (amended).
AB 3569 (Becerra); 1992 STAT. Ch. 950
Existing law exempts persons confined to a state correctional
facility or the California Youth Authority (CYA)2 from prosecution
12. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 762, sec. 1, at 2418 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 95.1). See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West Supp. 1992) (defining misdemeanor).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 95.1 (amended by Chapter 971). Chapter 971 states that the
punishment for this offense is imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by
imprisonment in the state prison, or by a fine not to exceed $10,000, or by both imprisonment and
a fine. Md.; see id. § 15 (West 1988) (defining public offense); see also Burks v. United States, 287
F.2d 117, 122 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that, in California, a public offense is synonymous with a
crime, and a crime consists of both felonies and misdemeanors); cf. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-
4a (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-225.2 (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-11-15.3 (1992)
(providing that anyone who threatens a person who has served as a juror, or that person's family,
because of that person's service as a juror, is guilty of a felony).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 95.2 (enacted by Chapter 971) (specifying that the person
providing information regarding a juror must have knowledge of the relationship of the parties and
must provide the information without court authorization and juror consent).
15. Id
16. Id § 95.3 (enacted by Chapter 971).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5003 (West Supp. 1992) (specifying institutions over which the
Department of Corrections has jurisdiction).
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for nonfelony3 driving offenses that are pending against such persons
at the time they are committed to the facility.' This exemption does
not, however, apply to nonfelony driving offenses that would require
the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) 5 to immediately suspend6
or revoke7 the driver's license upon conviction of the pending
nonfelony offense.8 Chapter 950 specifies that reckless driving9 and
2. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1710 (West 1990) (creating the Department of the Youth
Authority). The California Youth Authority Act is intended to rehabilitate young offenders through
training and treatment as a substitute for retributive punishment. lt § 1700 (West 1990); In re Aaron
N., 70 Cal. App. 3d 931, 938-39, 139 Cal. Rptr. 258, 262 (1977).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that every crime or public
offense not classified as a felony is a misdemeanor or infraction); id. (defining a felony as a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in state prison); see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 40000.1 (West
1991) (defining infraction); U §§ 40000.5-40000.77 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992) (enumerating
misdemeanor vehicle code offenses).
4. 'CAL. VEH. CODE § 41500(a) (amended by Chapter 950).
5. See id. §§ 1500-1501 (West 1990) (creating and granting power to the Department of
Motor Vehicles).
6. See id. § 13102 (West 1990) (defining license suspension).
7. See id. § 13101 (West 1990) (defining license revocation).
8. Id. § 41500(d) (amended by Chapter 950); see id. §§ 13350, 13352 (West Supp. 1992)
(specifying the nonfelony offenses for which the DMV must revoke or suspend a driver's license
including hit and run injury accidents, reckless driving that results in bodily injury, and driving under
the influence); People v. Minor, 204 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 9, 251 Cal. Rptr. 636, 637-38 (1988)
(holding that a repeat DUI offender confined to a state prison at the time a new DUI offense was
pending, was not exempt from prosecution under Vehicle Code § 41500(a) because the DMV was
required to revoke the driver's license upon conviction of the new offense). Upon a first DUI
conviction, the court may grant probation and permit the defendant to retain a restricted driver's
license. CAL. VEIl. CODE §§ 23160(c), 23161(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992); see People v. Freeman, 225
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 8, 275 Cal. Rptr. 373, 378 (1987) (holding that five separate defendants were
entitled to dismissal of first time DUI offenses that were pending at the time each person was
committed to either a state correctional facility or the CYA because the court could grant probation
to the defendants and not suspend their licenses).
9. See CAL. VEl. CODE § 23103 (West Supp. 1992) (defining reckless driving as driving a
vehicle with wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property).
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driving under the influence1" (DUI) are not exempt from pro-
secution as pending non-felony driving offenses.1
TKT
Criminal Procedure; prisoners--medical treatment
Penal Code § 2653 (new).
AB 2422 (Lee); 1992 STAT. Ch. 602
Under existing law, a judge may order a prisoner' needing
medical attention to be moved to a designated hospital for
treatment.2 Existing law provides that if a prisoner's medical needs
10. See id. § 23152 (West Supp. 1992) (defining driving under the influence as driving a
vehicle with a 0.08 percent or greater blood alcohol content or while under the influence of any
drug); see also id. §§ 23160-23190 (West Supp. 1992) (specifying the punishment for DUI offenses).
11. Id § 41500(0 (amended by Chapter 950). Courts have interpreted Vehicle Code § 41500
to permit dismissal of DUI offenses when the DMV is not automatically required to revoke or
suspend a driver's license following conviction of a nonfelony offense. See People v. Freeman, 225
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 9, 275 Cal. Rptr. 373, 379 (1987). The Freeman court held that until the
Legislature expressly changes the wording of § 41500, the statute should be interpreted to permit
dismissal of fist time DUI offenses. Id The court acknowledged that the real concern for seekIng
a conviction in first time DUI offenses is so that prior convictions can be charged in the event of
some future violation. Id at 9,275 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Chapter 950 is intended to clarify Vehicle Code
§ 41500, and to eliminate the ambiguities that permit dismissal of pending nonfelony reckless driving
and DUI offenses. SENATE CommrrrEE ON JUDIcIARY, ComMIm='ea ANALYSIs Op AB 3569, at 2
(June 30, 1992).
1. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 844 (West 1980) (defining prisoner); Zeilman v. Kern County,
168 Cal. App. 3d 1174, 1183, 214 Cal. Rptr. 746, 752 (1985) (stating that a person who had not
completed the booking procedure by the time of the injury was not a prisoner with respect to the
public entity liability statute); Meyer v. City of Oakland, 107 Cal. App. 3d 770, 778, 166 Cal. Rptr.
79, 84 (1980) (holding that a person being confined in the city jail for public intoxication was not
a prisoner within the meaning of statute imposing civil liability on a public entity); Sahley v. San
Diego County, 69 Cal. App. 3d 347, 349, 138 Cal. Rptr. 34, 35 (1977) (stating that a person was a
prisoner for purposes of a statute imposing liability on a public entity inasmuch as he had been
booked and arraigned).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4011 (a) (West 1982); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)
(stating that the government has an obligation to furnish medical care for the prisoners whom it
incarcerates); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 4011.1(a) (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing the county or
city to make a claim for reimbursement of medical charges); id. § 4023 (West 1982) (requiring all
county jails averaging more than 100 prisoners per day to make available a licensed and practicing
physician for the care of the prisoners).
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are immediately life threatening, a sheriff' or jailer may authorize
the guarded transportation of that prisoner to a hospital.4 It is a
misdemeanor under existing law to withhold care where to do so
would injure or impair the health of a prisoner.5
Chapter 602 provides that if a physician employed by the
Department of Corrections or Department of Youth Authority makes
a written determination that medical treatment is necessary to prevent
certain violations of the prisoner's rights or to prevent serious harm
to the prisoner's health, such an order for medical treatment may not
3. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26600 (West 1990) (defining sheriff).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4011.5 (West 1982); see 1. § 4011.7 (West 1982) (providing for the
removal of guards from a hospital if the prisoner is charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor);
id. § 4011.9 (West 1982) (authorizing the removal of guards from a hospital if the prisoner is charged
or convicted of a felony, yet poses no risk of harm or escape).
5. lid § 2652 (West 1982); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 844.6(a) (West 1980) (immunizing a
public entity from liability against injuries caused by or to any prisoner); id. § 844.6(d) (West 1980)
(stating that such immunity does not extend to a public employee who proximately causes injury to
a prisoner by a negligent or wrongful act or omission); id. § 845.6 (West 1980) (providing that a
public entity or public employee will not be liable for injuries caused by the failure to obtain medical
care for a prisoner unless an employee knows or has reason to know that a prisoner is in need of
immediate medical care and that employee fails to summon aid); Peterson v. Los Angeles County,
185 Cal. App. 3d 708, 709, 230 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1986) (stating that a prisoner who suffered a
broken leg after being kicked by a county employee could not maintain a suit against the county,
since the county was immune from liability under § 844.6(a)); Hart v. County of Orange, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 303-08, 62 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75-78 (explaining the differences between §§ 844.6 and
845.6); Marshall v. City of Los Angeles, 131 Cal. App. 2d 812, 816, 281 P. 2d 544, 546 (1955)
(providing that, in the absence of a state statute, a county will not be liable for failing to furnish
medical care to prisoners). See generally Michael Cameron Friedman, Crueland Unusual Punishment
in the Provision of Prison Medical Treatment: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard,
VAND. L. REv. 921, 921-44 (1992) (discussing the application of the Eighth Amendment to prison
health care, and describing aspects of imprisonment that affect the health of prisoners).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 147 (West 1988) (creating an offense for the willful mistreatment
of a prisoner while under the custody of an officer); id. § 673 (West 1988) (prohibiting the cruel and
unusual punishment of prisoners); i. § 2650 (West 1982) (providing that prisoners are subject to all
the protections of the law, and all injuries to prisoners are punishable in the same manner as
nonprisoners); i. § 2652 (West 1982) (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments for prisoners).
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be modified or canceled without first obtaining written approval of
the chief medical officer in charge of the institution.7
DHT
Criminal Procedure; prisoner sentencing credits
Penal Code § 2933.6 (new).
SB 1509 (Leonard); 1992 STAT. Ch. 1175
Existing law provides that a person convicted of a crime and
sentenced to state prison may be entitled to a reduction in the time
served for performance in work, training, or educational programs.'
Existing law also states that any prisoner who had been denied the
opportunity to earn worktime credits cannot be awarded worktime
credits to reduce their sentence. Chapter 1175 further provides that
7. Id § 2653(a) (enacted by Chapter 602). A physician's order can be altered or canceled
if the prisoner has a violent history that requires additional measures to protect the security of the
institution and if specified in writing by the warden, or if immediate security needs require alternate
or modified procedures. Id Any person who violates this section will be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action by the Department of Corrections. Id § 2653(b) (enacted by Chapter 602).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933(a) (West Supp. 1992). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (Supp. 1992)
(providing credit towards sentence for satisfactory behavior); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-7a (West
1988); KY. REv. STAT. § 197.045(1) (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.3 (West 1992);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 129 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 800.33.(2) (West
Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.04.(1) (West 1992); N.Y. CoRaRcr. LAv § 803.1 (McKinney
Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 138.1 (West 1991) (providing for good conduct credit for
prisoners). See generally James B. Jacobs, Sentencing By Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA
L. REv. 217 (1982) (discussing the implications of prison officials' sentence reduction authority).
2. CAL PENAL CODE § 2933(a) (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 2933(b) (stating worktime
credit is a privilege that may be forfeited, not a right); id. § 2932(a) (West Supp. 1992) (listing
grounds for denying worktime credits previously earned); CAL. CODE REaS. tit. 15, § 3341.5(c)(4)
(1992) (stating serious misconduct while in a Security Housing Unit may result in loss of clean
conduct credits); People v. Davis, 154 Cal. App. 3d 253, 254, 201 Cal. Rptr. 422, 423 (1984)
(holding that the purpose of worktime credits is to provide incentives for prisoners to develop job
skills and work ethics); see also In re Monigold, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1227, 253 Cal. Rptr. 120,
121 (1988) (holding that the unavailability of the worktime credit program to persons serving
indeterminate terms does not deprive prisoners serving life sentences of equal protection under the
law); cf. AlASKA STAT. § 33.20.050 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-7a (West 19:38); IowA
CODE ANN. § 903A.3 (West Supp. 1992); KY. REV. STAT. § 197.045(1) (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4 (West 1992); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 127, § 129 (West 1991); MicH.
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every prisoner confined in a Security Housing Unit 3 or Admini-
strative Segregation Unit,4 as punishment for specific misconduct,5
shall be ineligible to receive worktime credits or good behavior
credits during that period of confinement.'
JWC
Criminal Procedure; public records--victims of crime
Penal Code §§ 293, 293.5, 841.5 (new).
AB 1681 (Mountjoy); 1992 STAT. Ch. 3
(Effective February 10, 1992)
SB 296 (Torres); 1992 STAT. Ch. 502
Existing law prohibits an attorney from disclosing to a defendant
the address or telephone number of a victim' or witness 2 a pro-
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.33.(5) (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.04.(2) (West 1992);
N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 803.1 (McKinney Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 138.1 (West
1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-189 (Michie 1991) (providing for the loss or forfeiture of good
conduct time).
3. See CAL. CODE REOS. tit. 15, § 3341.5(c) (1992) (requiring prisoner assignment to certain
designated housing units when the inmate has been found guilty of an offense, or is deemed to be
a threat to the safety of others, or to the security of the institution).
4. See CAL. CODE PEGS. tit. 15, § 3335(a) (1992) (authorizing inmate removal to an
administrative segregation unit when the inmate's presence poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the inmate or others, endangers institution security, or jeopardizes the integrity of an investigation
of alleged serious misconduct or criminal activity).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 1175) (listing the offenses, if
committed, that would prevent the prisoner from receiving worktime credits or good behavior credits).
6. Id § 2933.6(a) (enacted by Chapter 1175).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.01(b) (West 1988) (defining victim as a person against
whom a crime is committed).
2. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1878 (West 1983) (defining witness as a person under oath
whose declaration is received as evidence for any purpose); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.01(c) (West
1988) (defining witness as a person who is or is expected or likely to testify for the prosecution).
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secutor intends to call as a witness at trial unless specifically
permitted to do so by the court
Except as otherwise specified, Chapter 3 prohibits an employee
of a law enforcement agency from disclosing to any potential
defendant in a criminal action, the address or telephone number of
any victim or witness to the alleged offense.' Chapter 3 provides that
the prohibition shall not obstruct the right of a defendant to obtain
information necessary for the preparation of his or her defense
through the discovery process, or the right of an attorney to obtain the
address or telephone number of any victim of, or witness to, a crime
for which that attorney's client has been arrested or charged. 5
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.2 (West Supp. 1992); see People v. Miller, 106 A.D.2d 787,
788 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to know the address of the prosecution's
witness since he failed to show special circumstances dictating its need); Deutscher v. State, 601 P.2d
407, 418 (Nev. 1979) (holding that the defendant's right to disclosure of a witness's address was
denied since the defendant failed to show how disclosure would make the cross-examination more
meaningful). See generally Deborah Glynn, Proposition 115: The Crime ictims Justice Reform Act,
22 PAC. LJ. 1010, 1022-23 (1991) (explaining the extent to which Proposition 115 limits a
defendant's discovery rights, particularly those regarding access to arrest and crime reports); Steve
Holden, Note, Izazaga v. Superior Court: Affirming the Public's Cry to Unshackle the Criminal
Prosecution System, 23 PAC. U. 1721 (1992) (examining the constitutionality of the discovery
provisions enacted by Proposition 115).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 841.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 3); cf. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § I-
19(b)(3)(E) (West Supp. 1992) (prohibiting the release of investigative records if the release would
result in disclosure of the name and the address of the victim of a sexual assault); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.07(3)(h) (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting disclosure of investigative information including the
photograph, name, address, or other fact or information which reveals the identity of a sex crime
victim); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.501(3) (1991) (prohibiting disclosure of investigatory information,
except for crime reports and records of arrest, including the identity of the complaining party and
victim). Currently only three states completely prohibit public disclosure of the names of rape or sex
offense victims. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b(l) (McKinney 1992) (allowing for release
of victims' names only in rare cases where good cause is shown to the court); ALASKA STAT. §
12.61.140 (Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(4)(d) (West Supp. 1992).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 841.5(b)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 3); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15
(stating that a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him); CAL. PENAL CODE § 869(a) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that the testimony of witnesses
that is recorded in homicide cases must include the name, place of residence, and profession of the
witness in order to authenticate their testimony); People v. Watson, 146 Cal. App. 3d 12, 20-21, 193
Cal. Rptr. 849, 854 (1983) (holding that although the trial court erred in not forcing the
witness/informant to disclose his address, the defendant was not deprived of a substantial right since
there was plenty of evidence available to accurately evaluate the witness's credibility); People v.
Gallo, 127 Cal. App. 3d 828, 836, 179 Cal. Rptr. 662, 665-66 (1981) (holding that defendant was
not denied his Sixth Amendment right to assess the credibility of the witness/informant's testimony
when denied the witness's address since it was already brought to light that the witness was granted
immunity, used and sold drugs, was a convicted felon, and possessed an illegal weapon); Miller v.
Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 381, 386-87, 159 Cal. Rptr. 456, 459 (1979) (holding that denial of
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Chapter 3 also provides that nothing in this section shall prevent a
law enforcement agency from releasing the entire contents of an
accident report.6
Chapter 502 requires a law enforcement agency7 employees to
inform a person9 who allegedly has been the victim of a specified
sex offense"0 that the person may request that his or her name may
be withheld from public record."
DCH IV/ACR
a key informant's address for no reason denied the defense its due right to test the credibility of the
witness which was questionable since the informant had a bad reputation for veracity and narcotics
dealings); People v. Cundle, 98 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 34, 37, 159 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1979) (holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant, convicted of indecent
exposure, the names of the witnesses against him since he never filed a motion for production of
those names).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 841.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 3).
7. See id. § 1545(b) (West 1982) (defining law enforcement agency as the California
Attorney General, every district attorney, and every California State Agency expressly authorized by
statute to investigate or prosecute law violators).
8. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3351-3352 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) (defining employee).
9. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6252(c) (West Supp. 1992) (defining person).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 293(e) (enacted by Chapter 502) (specifying sex offenses to
which this section applies). The specified sex offenses in § 293(e) are identical to those sex crimes
which are provided for in Government Code § 6254(0(2). CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(0(2) (West
Supp. 1992); see supra note 4 (enumerating the crimes which are listed in Government Code §
6254(f)(2)).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 293(a) (enacted by Chapter 502). Any written report of the alleged
sex offense must note that the victim has been informed that his or her name may be withheld from
his or her response. Id. § 293(h) (enacted by Chapter 502). Chapter 502 additionally states that the
law enforcement agency may not reveal the name and the address of the victim to any person but
the prosecutor. Id. § 293(c)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 502); see Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524,
541 (1989) (implying in dictum that the government may withhold information by restricting public
access to records). But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988) (Federal Freedom of Information Act) (FOIA)
(exempting from public disclosure records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes
when disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy or
lead to the disclosure of a confidential source's identity). See generally, Sarah Anderson Hutt, In
Praise of Public Access: Why the Government Should Disclose the Identities ofAlleged Crime Victim,
41 DuxE LJ. 368, 368, 384 (Nov. 1991) (addressing the conflict between the right to privacy and
First Amendment rights, and stating that although FOIA does not specifically mention victims, a
person who has the desire to remain confidential, might be considered a "confidential source"). If the
court finds it reasonably necessary to protect the privacy of alleged victim, it may, under certain
circumstances, order that the name of the alleged victim in all records and during all proceedings be
Jane or John Doe. CAL. PENAL CODE § 293.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 502); see id. (specifying the
circumstances under which the court may order the name of the alleged victim to be changed).
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Criminal Procedure; registration of juvenile arson offenders
Penal Code § 457.1 (amended).
SB 2008 (Calderon); 1992 STAT. Ch. 691
Under existing law, persons' who are convicted, discharged or
paroled2 from a California penal institution, or convicted in any
other state or federal court, for arson3, or attempted arson may, under
certain circumstances,4 be required to register with the local law
enforcement agency of any city or county in which he or she intends
to reside.' Chapter 691 includes persons who have been discharged
or paroled from the California Youth Authority, 6 where they have
1. See CAL. PEiAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining persons as corporations as well as
natural persons).
2. See id §§ 3000-3065 (West Supp. 1992) (outlining the parole system). See generally 3
B.E. WmuN & NORMAN L. EPsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1725, at 2040 (2d ed. 1989)
(defining parole as the release of a prisoner prior to expiration of his term of imprisonment
conditioned upon his continuing good behavior during the remainder of his term).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 (Vest Supp. 1992) (defming arson as willfully and
maliciously setting fire to, burning, causing to bum, aiding, counseling, or procuring the burning of
any structure, forest land, or property).
4. The court may require registration if it finds: (1) That the person committing the offense
has previously been convicted of arson; (2) the person has committed multiple counts of arson,
relating to different events or occurrences; or (3) the person showed compulsive behavior. Id. §
457.1(b)(1)-(3) (amended by Chapter 691); see People v. Adams, 224 Cal. App. 3d 705, 710, 274
Cal. Rptr. 94, 97-8 (1990) (defiming compulsive behavior, and holding that the enlistment of
psychiatric experts is not always necessary in the determination of whether a particular defendant
exhibits compulsive behavior); cf. Review of Selected 1989 California Legislation, 21 PAc. L.J. 441
(1990) (discussing registration of convicted arsonists).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1(b) (amended by Chapter 691); see id. § 457.10) (amended by
Chapter 691) (making the violation of this provision a misdemeanor); k § 457.1(g) (amended by
Chapter 691) (outlining the registration process for convicted arsonists); see also id. § 457.1(b)
(amended by Chapter 691) (requiring registration with the chief of police or the sheriff within 30
days of coming into a town). The registration requirement is based on the premise that certain types
of criminals are more likely to be repeat offenders, and that law enforcement's ability to prevent
those crimes and to apprehend those types of criminals will be improved if these repeat offenders'
whereabouts are known. People v. Adams, 224 Cal. App. 3d 705,710,274 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97 (1990).
Other states have imposed registration requirements for various crimes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.13 (West 1992) (requiring registration for all convicted felons); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, par.
223 (Smith-Hurd 1990) (requiring registration for habitual child sex offenders); TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring the registration of specified sexual offenders).
6. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 1766(f) (Vest 1984); id. § 1767 (West 1984)
(authorizing and providing the general conditions under which the Youthful Offender Parole Board
may discharge or parole a ward of the Youth Authority).
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been confined for arson or attempted arson, among those who may be
required to register.7
Chapter 691 further provides that the duty to register, for offenses
adjudicated by a juvenile court, ends when the person reaches the age
of twenty-five.' Additionally, Chapter 691, requires that all records
relating to the registration, for offenses adjudicated by a juvenile
court, which are in the custody of the Department of Justice, law
enforcement agencies and other agencies or public officials, are to be
destroyed when the person reaches the age of twenty-five, or has his
or her records sealed, which ever comes first.9
BAB
Criminal Procedure; sentence enhancements for crimes against
the disabled
Penal Code §§ 422.72, 667.9, 667.10 (amended).
SB 1288 (Lockyer); 1992 STAT. Ch. 265
AD 3366 (Umberg); 1992 STAT. Ch. 266
Existing law provides, except as specified, that persons who
commit or attempt to commit a felony' because of the victim's race,
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1(b) (amended by Chapter 691).
8. L § 457.1(d) (amended by Chapter 691).
9. L § 457.1(e) (amended by Chapter 691); see CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 781 (West
Supp. 1992) (outlining the procedures for sealing the records of juveniles); see also T.N.G. v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 767,777,484 P.2d 981,987,94 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819 (1971) (describing the
application of California Welfare and Institutions Code § 781). While the term "sealing- is an
ambiguous term, under § 781, sealed records are those that are retained by the juvenile court and
closed to inspection. T.N.G., 4 Cal. 3d at 777 n.12, 484 P.2d at 987 n.12, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 819 n.12.
All other agencies that have possession of the records in question must return them to juvenile court
for either safe keeping or destruction. Il
1. See CAL PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1992) (defining felony).
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color, religion, nationality, country of origin, ancestry, or sexual
orientation shall receive a sentence enhancement.2 Under Chapter
266, an additional term is applied to felonies committed or
attempted3 because of the victim's disability.4 Additionally, Chapter
266 makes the defendant's personal use of a firearm5 during one of
these crimes an aggravating factor subject to one of the above en-
hancements.
6
Existing law provides that every person who has a prior
conviction of specified offenses,7 and who commits one or more of
those offenses against a person sixty-five years or older, blind,
disabled, or under the age of fourteen years, will receive a two year
sentence enhancement! Chapter 265 further provides that every
2. Id § 422.75 (amended by Chapter 266). See generally People v. Lashley, 1 Cal. App. 4th
938, 948, 2 Cal. Rptr. 629, 635 (1991) (stating that specific intent to violate the constitutional rights
of another does not require actual awareness of this violation on the part of the defendant); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992) (striking down as unconstitutional an ordinance
which makes it a cime for a person to place a symbol or object which the person knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
religion or gender on public or private property). The Court in /A. V held the statute facially
unconstitutional under the First Amendment because the ordinance went beyond mere content
discrimination to actual viewpoint discrimination. l See generally Virginia Nia Lee & Joseph M.
Fernandez, Legislative Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: The Massachusetts Experience and
Beyond, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 287 (1990) (discussing recommendations for state legislatures
in enacting statutes to combat hate-motivated violence); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Bias Crines:
Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence," 99 YALE LJ. 845 (1990)
(discussing the use of criminal statutes to redress physical injury which results from bias crimes); cf.
1992 IOWA LEGis. SERv. 2065 (West) (establishing hate crimes as a criminal offense).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 21a (West 1988) (defining attempt as consisting of a specific
intent to commit an act and an ineffectual act done toward its commission).
4. Id § 422.75 (amended by Chapter 266); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(g) (West Supp. 1992)
(defining disabled person); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1988) (defining disability); ALASKA STAT. §
11.76.130 (1970) (defining interference of rights of a disabled person); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-8
(West Supp. 1992) (criminalizing the endangerment of the welfare of a disabled person).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(a)-(e) (West 1992) (defining firearm).
6. Id § 422.75(c) (amended by Chapter 266). By making the use of a firearm an aggravating
factor, the sentencing judge has the ability to order the maximum sentence. Id. § 1170(b) (West Supp.
1992); Cf. IDAHO CODE § 19-2520 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. 46-18-221 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN.
31-18-16 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-87 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307 (1991)
(establishing sentence enhancements for use of a firearm during the commission of a crime).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.9(b)(1)-(7) (amended by Chapter 265) (listing the offenses
of robbery, rape, kidnapping, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, sodomy or oral copulation, mayhem,
and first degree burglary).
8. Id. § 667.9 (amended by Chapter 265); see id § 667.9(a) (amended by Chapter 265)
(requiring that the victim's disability or condition be known or that it reasonably should have been
known to the defendant).
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person who has a prior conviction for designated offenses against a
person who is deaf or developmentally disabled9 will receive a
sentence enhancement. 10
HAT
Criminal Procedure; sex offender registration
Penal Code § 290 (amended).
AB 2297 (Umberg); 1992 STAT. Ch. 197
Existing law requires persons convicted of certain sex offenses to
register with law enforcement officials in the city or county of their
residence.' Chapter 197 expressly subjects a person convicted of
9. See id § 667.9(d)(I)-(3) (amended by Chapter 265) (defining developmentally disabled
as a severe, chronic disability which is all of the following: (1) Attributable to a mental or physical
impairment; (2) likely to continue indefinitely; (3) results in substantial functional limitation in self-
care, language, mobility, self-direction, capacity for independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6001(2) (1988) (defining developmentally disabled).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.9(a) (amended by Chapter 265).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a) (amended by Chapter 197). Place of residence includes city,
county, or university of domicile. L This section applies to: (1) Assault with intent to commit rape
or sodomy; (2) penetration with foreign object; (3) sex with an unmarried female under 18; (4)
abduction; (5) lewd and lascivious conduct; (6) incest; (7) sodomy; (8) sex acts with a child under
14; (9) oral copulation; and (10) rape or sodomy. L; see also People v. Monroe, 168 Cal. App. 3d
1205, 1209, 215 Cal. Rptr. 51, 53 (1985) (holding that § 290 uses the mandatory word "shall" and
leaves no discretion in the trial judge not to require registration); In re Roland DeBeque, 212 Cal.
App. 3d 241, 245, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443 (1989) (holding that requiring the registration of a
defendant convicted of masturbating in front of young boys was not cruel and unusual punishment);
cf CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11590 (West 1991) (requiring registration for controlled
substance offenders). See generally Kenneth Reich, Many Simply Ignore the Law; Sex Offender
Registration Not Working, L.A. Tzms, Aug. 8, 1986, at Al. For examples of other states' laws
requiring registration, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13a-11-200 (1991); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821
(1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (1992); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 223 (1991); 1992 LA.
Aers 388; MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.152 (1991); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2950.06 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 582 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.519
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1992); NVASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.130 (1991).
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assault with intent to commit oral copulation to the registration
requirement.2
HAT
2. CAL PENAL CODE § 290 (amended by Chapter 197). But see People v. Saunders, 232 Cal.
App. 3d 1592, 1594, 284 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (1991) (holding that a defendant convicted of assault
with intent to commit oral copulation was not required to register as a sex offender because the
registration requirement under the statute did not expressly require it for the convicted crime).
Chapter 197 was enacted with the intent of abrogating the Sanders decision. 1992 Cal. Slat. ch. 197,
sec. 2, at 781.
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